The No.1 Anti-Fans in Basketball-Chapter 428 - 221: The Battle of Bathwater
Chapter 428: Chapter 221: The Battle of Bathwater fгee𝑤ebɳoveɭ.cøm
Two days later, the G3 between the Spurs and the Grizzlies came to an end.
After returning to the Holy City, the Spurs beat the Grizzlies 108 to 101, pulling one back.
Despite Popovich’s tough talk after G2, he obediently reverted to a 2-1-2 zone defense in G3.
Or rather, his seeming despair after the G2 was an act designed to lull the Grizzlies into complacency.
However, that wasn’t the key to the Spurs’ victory, as Hansen still scored 35 points.
The real issue was that, on that night, not only did the Spurs maintain their defensive intensity, but their offense opened up as well.
And the key to igniting the offense was an unlikely hero.
Green had been shooting well from three in the first two rounds for the Spurs, but he struggled in the first two games against the Grizzlies, hitting just 2 out of 10 attempts from beyond the arc.
You might say it was because Hansen was defending him, but the deeper issue was his mentality.
How could you maintain your composure when you’ve been utterly shut down on defense because you had a clean performance the night before?
But when they used the zone defense, Green no longer had to face Hansen one-on-one, and the scenario changed completely.
Freed from pressure on the defensive end, Green had an explosive rebound performance.
He hit 6 of 11 threes, including 4 of 6 in the first half, scoring 24 points and having the highlight game of his career.
Now, the Spurs’ offense revolved around pick-and-rolls with Parker and Duncan, a tactic that happened to counter the Grizzlies well, so Joerger’s defensive strategy was to help defend the pick-and-roll from the wings.
Under such conditions, whether Green/Leonard shot accurately or not from the corner on the strong side, the level of pressure on the Grizzlies was entirely different.
With Green shooting well, Joerger had to reduce Hansen’s help defense, which resulted in Green’s shooting percentage dropping, but it opened up the Spurs’ pick-and-roll.
It was a career night for the unsung hero, yet it stirred some memories in Hansen’s mind.
Popovich’s Hammer Strategy was essentially a series of off-ball screens designed for shooters, set up around Parker and Duncan’s pick-and-rolls.
The reason it emerged in the 2013-2014 season was due to Green’s shining moment in the 2013 finals.
"In history," against the Heat in the finals, Green excelled, hitting 25 three-pointers in the first five games, breaking Ray Allen’s finals record for most threes in just five games, with a staggering 66% shooting percentage.
In terms of just those first five games, he was arguably the best shooter in history.
Now the Spurs, pushed to the edge of the cliff early, saw Green explode before even reaching the finals.
After G3, Joerger talked strategy with Hansen.
Since Green was Hansen’s man, and Hansen also needed to help defend, they had to make a choice.
It was a difficult decision, as it was a matter of choosing between two poisons.
But Hansen knew very well that it was highly probable for Green to maintain that level of accuracy.
However, Hansen himself came up as a shooter and knew that shooters needed to keep their rhythm, so he suggested a defense that would start tight and then loosen.
Specifically, that meant tightly guarding Green at the outset, preventing him from getting opportunities, and trying to limit the Spurs’ Parker-Duncan pick-and-roll as much as possible.
If they couldn’t contain it, they’d have to trade blows with the Spurs.
After all, Parker and Duncan couldn’t always be on the court simultaneously, and the pick-and-roll naturally wouldn’t work as well when one of them rested.
And if Green didn’t get the chance to heat up, even if he got opportunities later, the shooting percentage would be hard to guarantee.
Hansen’s empathetic thinking was quickly endorsed by Joerger.
Just like Hansen once reflected with Tois, as long as there were ideas, Hansen could definitely become an excellent head coach after retirement.
By G4, Hansen quickly put the strategy they’d discussed into action.
No, he even doubled down on it.
Not only did he stick to Green, but he also provided tough physical defense when Green ran his routes, complete with trash talk.
In matters of mind games, Hansen was indeed a professional.
The two teams were neck and neck in the first half; in the second half, Hansen started to constrict on help defending the pick-and-roll, and sure enough, Green began to miss frequently from downtown.
After all, Green was still young, and having his mentality disrupted by Hansen for half the game could hardly leave him unaffected.
With the Spurs’ offense declining sharply in the second half, the game tilted toward the Grizzlies.
to 93, the Grizzlies took the critical G4, making the series 3 to 1, holding match point.
Meanwhile in the Eastern Conference Finals, the Pacers lived up to Hansen’s expectations, finishing four games at 2-2 against the Heat, taking things up to Heavenly King Mountain, showing signs of pushing the series to a decisive Game 7.
A week later, the conference finals concluded.
In The West, the Spurs valiantly clawed back an away game in their dire situation but lost G6 at home after Hansen exploded for 43 points, eliminating them 2 to 4.
Two years had passed, and much had changed, but ultimately the ending remained the same.
Popovich played it unusually straight in this series not because he didn’t want to be cunning, but because he didn’t dare.
Once again, it was proven that when people say you have weapons of mass destruction, you better actually have them.
The Grizzlies retained Johnson and traded for Jones, both of whom were not regulars in the rotation this season, but their presence loomed over their opponents like a sword overhead.